


## Implementation of the Flag Raising Troops Program Policy at the Pancasila Ideology Development Agency

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| Article Info   | ABSTRACT   |
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| <b>Keywords:</b><br>Policy Implementation,<br>Paskibraka Program,<br>Pancasila,<br>BPIP  | This study discusses the implementation of the Paskibraka Program policy by BPIP as a strategic effort in forming a young generation with Pancasila character. The main problem in this study is how this policy is implemented by BPIP and what factors support and hinder the implementation of the policy throughout Indonesia. This study uses a descriptive qualitative approach with data collection techniques through in-depth interviews, documentation studies, and observations. Informants were selected using purposive sampling and snowball sampling techniques, involving BPIP officials, the Provincial Kesbangpol, and DPPI. The instruments used were interview guidelines, recording devices, and policy documents as analysis materials. The results of the study indicate that the implementation of the policy generally runs according to the direction of the regulation, with several challenges such as limited resources in the regions, less than optimal cross-agency communication, and differences in understanding the redefinition of the Paskibraka program. Supporting factors include regulatory support, BPIP's commitment as the main sponsor, and the existence of supporting organizations such as DPPI. This study concludes that the success of policy implementation is highly dependent on synergy between stakeholders, clarity of institutional roles, and optimization of existing resources. The recommendations submitted include the preparation of a national master plan, strengthening the coordinating role of BPIP, and expanding partnership networks in the regions as a strategic step in fostering the Pancasila ideology in a sustainable manner. |
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### INTRODUCTION

Indonesia is expected to face a golden year in 2045 because it will get a demographic bonus while celebrating 100 years of Indonesian independence. Therefore, it is important for Indonesia to take advantage of the momentum of the demographic bonus. Based on projections made by the Central Statistics Agency, in 2045 it is projected that 66-68% of Indonesia's population will be in the productive age group, namely 15-64 years. The demographic bonus must be utilized optimally to drive a faster economy and realize our dream of becoming a developed country. However, we must see the demographic bonus as

a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it will be an extraordinary advantage if we prepare properly, but it will be a disaster if we do not prepare properly.

Based on the Indonesia 2045 Scenario published by Lemhannas RI, it is explained in the Mata Air Scenario that the Indonesian Generation 2045 views ties with Indonesia no longer on the basis of historical romanticism but the benefits of joining Indonesia. In the sense that the community or region must feel the benefits of joining Indonesia. It is projected that the Government is trying to maintain Indonesia by fulfilling the expectations of the regions. Regions that are rich in natural resources as the largest contributors to the state treasury receive more attention. The aspirations of the region will be considered and regional development will be a priority. However, the central government's efforts to develop the regions are not supported by good and even quality institutions and human resources. Many regional heads actually misappropriate the disbursement of development funds from the central government for political interests and to maintain power.

Rapid development in new areas has become an attraction for people to migrate from densely populated areas such as Java. The new development center areas are experiencing a social crisis, the quality of human resources of the native community is less competitive than that of immigrant communities in utilizing the wealth of the region. While there are areas that are abundant in development, there are also areas that are less touched by development. This gap causes jealousy which leads to the desire for disintegration. In short, like a spring, this nation gives birth to new generations. Different life experiences from their predecessors make the generation of 2045 also have different views, including views on the state.

In the midst of the development of the era of globalization where the boundaries between countries in the world seem to disappear, transnational ideologies are also developing which are a threat to Indonesia. Especially for young people who often spend their time in cyberspace, it is very possible that there is content that can unknowingly indoctrinate their minds. As educational and scientific material, this is indeed good, but the problem is if the doctrine leads to extreme actions.

Seeing the potential and threats for future national leaders, the Government, in this case President Joko Widodo, issued Presidential Regulation Number 13 of 2021 concerning the Development of Pancasila Ideology for the Young Generation through the Flag Raising Troops Program. This Presidential Regulation emphasizes the Development of Pancasila Ideology for prospective flag raisers during the recruitment and selection process, flag raisers during the concentration and training process, and retired flag raisers after retiring. This comprehensive development for flag raisers is expected to educate the younger generation, especially flag raisers, so that they can internalize and actualize the values of Pancasila.

The Presidential Regulation is addressed to BPPI as the guardian of the Amanah, which is an institution that has only been established for 5 years. More effort is needed to implement this policy, especially because it must touch from the national level to the district/city level throughout Indonesia. Not only is the number of regions very large, namely 1 Center, 38 Provinces, and 514 Districts/Cities, there are also stakeholders involved in the implementation of the Paskibraka program. As the previous guardian of the Paskibraka program, the Ministry of Youth and Sports played a role in handling it at the Central level and the Youth and Sports

Service for the Province and City levels. In addition to youth affairs, BPIP must also coordinate with the Ministry of Home Affairs because the implementation of this policy will require support both in terms of personnel through National Unity and Politics and budgeting in the Regional Government through the Director General of Regional Finance and the Director General of Regional Development. Moreover, BPIP does not yet have a representative office at the Province or Regency/City level.

In carrying out their duties during the flag raising, Paskibraka uses the formation of group 17 as the Escort Troop, group 8 as the Core Troop and group 45 as the Guard Troop filled by the Armed Forces. So that Paskibraka is placed in group 17 and group 8. Ideally the number of troops is in accordance with the name of the troops so that the number of Paskibraka in each troop is 25 people. However, this number can vary according to the capabilities and needs of the Region itself. For example, at the central level the number of Paskibraka is 2 times the number of 38 Provinces in Indonesia, namely 76 people. So with the number of levels being 1 Center, 38 Provinces, and 514 Regencies/Cities, it can be estimated that at least  $\pm 13,876$  Paskibraka every year.

Based on the results of a survey conducted by BPIP in order to evaluate the implementation of the 2023 Paskibraka Program with respondents from the Head of the Provincial and Regency/City Kesbangpol Agency, there were several findings in the form of various obstacles. As many as 49% of respondents stated that the provision of funds and facilities in the implementation of the Paskibraka Program in the Region was insufficient, 33% of respondents stated that the Paskibraka training center time had not met the applicable provisions, 68% of respondents stated that the Regional Apparatus Organization (OPD) that organized the Paskibraka program did not have a follow-up program for Retired Paskibraka and 41% of respondents stated that the Paskibraka program budget allocated to OPD was not in accordance with the regulatory mandate. This study has objectives that can be described as follows: To explain Implementation of the Flag Raising Troops Program Policy at the Pancasila Ideology Development Agency; To explain the supporting and inhibiting factors Implementation of the Flag Raising Troops Program Policy at the Pancasila Ideology Development Agency; And To explain strategies in overcoming obstacles Implementation of the Flag Raising Troops Program Policy at the Pancasila Ideology Development Agency.

## METHODOLOGY

This study uses a descriptive qualitative approach, which aims to obtain descriptive data in the form of written or oral descriptions of individuals and observable behavior. In this study, informants are data sources that will later be used by researchers as sources of information, which will then become processed materials and references in the analysis of research data. Data sources to fulfill the needs of this study are divided into two primary and secondary sources.

In this study, the researcher will select informants by purposive sampling. This technique is chosen because it allows researchers to select individuals who are considered to have knowledge, experience and information relevant to the study. These informants are selected based on certain criteria that have been previously determined such as relevant roles

and experiences. However, there is a possibility that the informants who have been determined do not have sufficient data and information, so the snowball sampling technique is also possible to be carried out as a further method.

In order to understand, explore, and obtain information from the phenomena that are the focus of the research, researchers use several data collection techniques, namely interviews, written document reviews and supporting literature, and observations. According to Miles and Huberman, the process of data analysis and interpretation will be carried out interactively and will continue until the data is saturated, this activity will go through the stages of data reduction, data presentation, and verification.

## RESEARCH RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

### Implementation of the Paskibraka Program Policy

#### Communication

Based on the research results, communication in the implementation of the Paskibraka Program by BPIP has been carried out through adequate formal and institutional channels. BPIP has issued Technical Instructions in the form of Circulars, as well as carried out Technical Guidance and Coordination Meetings online and offline to implementers at the central and regional levels. The existence of these regulations and technical forums shows that vertical communication between levels of government is available and is being attempted systematically. This is also reinforced by the statement of the DPPI informant who stated that they received direct direction from BPIP and conveyed it back to regional partners.

However, field findings show that the main challenge of communication lies not in the substance of the information or its channels, but in the timeliness of its delivery. Informants from Kesbangpol said that although information from BPIP is clear and substantial, technical directives such as Juknis are often received very close to the implementation of activities. This forces regional implementers, especially Kesbangpol, to work extra fast in completing internal bureaucratic procedures and arranging technical implementation in a limited time. As a result, the implementation process is not optimal and has the potential to cause errors due to the lack of time to make thorough adjustments.

In the perspective of George C. Edward III's policy implementation theory, this condition reflects obstacles in the transmission and timeliness aspects of communication. Although the content of the communication is clear, if the delivery time is not right, the effectiveness of policy implementation will be disrupted. Edward emphasized that policy orders must be delivered clearly, consistently, and on time so as not to cause erroneous interpretations at the implementing level. Thus, to improve the effectiveness of communication in the implementation of the Paskibraka Program, BPIP needs to rearrange the technical document distribution mechanism so that it can be received by regional implementers long before the implementation time, ideally three to four months in advance. In addition, strengthening two-way communication between BPIP and regional implementers is also important so that responses and needs in the field can be responded to immediately. With improvements in the time dimension and communication feedback, it is hoped that policy implementation can run

more efficiently, adaptively, and in accordance with the direction of national policy that has been set.

### **1. Resource**

Based on the findings in the field, it can be concluded that the resource variables in the implementation of the Paskibraka Program policy by BPIP still face various significant challenges, both at the central and regional levels. At the central level, the institutional structure has indeed been available through the establishment of the Paskibraka Program Implementation Directorate, but the limited number of human resources causes the workload to be high and the effectiveness of program management is not optimal. The involvement of partners such as DPPI has proven to be very helpful in implementation in the field, but their status as non-governmental organizations that do not have a fixed budget allocation makes their contribution unstable and dependent on relational factors with regional implementers.

At the regional level, a similar situation also occurs. Although in terms of funding, regions such as DKI Jakarta have been able to support the implementation of the program, in terms of personnel, infrastructure, and organizational structure, the implementation of activities still faces various limitations. The limited number of staff and the absence of a special field or unit in Kesbangpol that handles Paskibraka cause regional implementers to have to work beyond their ideal capacity, especially when the implementation time approaches. The absence of independent ownership of infrastructure also causes implementers to rely on cooperation with other parties, which in certain conditions can hinder the effectiveness and smoothness of program implementation.

In the perspective of Edward III's implementation theory, these resource limitations are a serious inhibiting factor in the success of the policy. When human resources, budget, and facilities are not available or not allocated properly, the implementation of the policy tends not to run according to plan. Therefore, strengthening resources needs to be a primary concern in developing future policies. The government, in this case BPIP and cross-sector partners, need to design an institutional strengthening strategy that includes adding human resources, legalizing implementing partners, providing an even budget, and establishing technical units or fields that specifically handle Paskibraka in the regions. With comprehensive resource strengthening, the implementation of this policy is expected to run more efficiently, effectively, and sustainably.

### **2. Disposition**

Based on the results of the analysis of the disposition variables, it can be concluded that the attitudes, commitments, and readiness of the implementers of the Paskibraka Program policy basically show a positive tendency. Informants from BPIP, DPPI, and Kesbangpol generally have a supportive attitude towards the implementation of the policy, even in challenging conditions. This commitment can be seen from the efforts of the implementers in running the program despite being faced with limited resources, social pressure from previous implementers, and a fairly high workload. On the other hand, the implementers also showed a good level of compliance with the direction and technical instructions from BPIP, as well as a willingness to coordinate across actors for the smooth running of the program.



However, this good disposition has not been fully supported by a responsive institutional system and policies. Resistance from previous implementing organizations such as PPI, which still exist in several regions, often causes psychological pressure and social conflict against new implementers such as DPPI and Kesbangpol. In addition, the lack of clarity on incentives or formal recognition of implementing partners also has the potential to reduce the enthusiasm of implementers in the future, especially for those who work voluntarily and do not receive sufficient resource support.

Within the framework of Edward III, the positive disposition of the implementers is an important asset that must be maintained and strengthened through systemic support. The commitment and loyalty of the implementers are not enough if not accompanied by institutional legitimacy, policy protection, and ongoing coaching. Therefore, to maintain and improve the disposition of the implementers, an affirmative policy is needed that provides certainty of roles, incentives, and wider participation space for technical implementers, both at the central and regional levels. Thus, the disposition that has been the main strength in the implementation of the Paskibraka Program can continue to be maintained and transformed into collective energy in supporting the national vision carried by BPIP.

### 3. Bureaucratic Structure

Disclosure of key informants to this stage is carried out through a review of related indicators, namely organizational structure and Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). Based on the results of data collection, data reduction and data analysis, it can be understood that in terms of the bureaucratic structure of the implementation of the Paskibraka Program, there are findings in terms of organization and Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). With the issuance of Presidential Regulation Number 51 of 2022, BPIP does not have a work unit whose duties and functions directly handle Paskibraka or the like. Therefore, the Directorate of Control in the Deputy for Control and Evaluation was appointed to implement the Paskibraka Program. In its development, the Directorate of Paskibraka Program Implementation was formed in the Deputy for Education and Training whose specific duties and functions are to handle the implementation of the Paskibraka Program. So that in the implementation of the Paskibraka Program, the structure of the Directorate is appropriate, but it is estimated that in its development in the future a higher structure will be needed in the form of a Deputy.

Regarding the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), BPIP provides Technical Instructions in the implementation of the Formation of Paskibraka and the procedures for appointing the Indonesian Paskibraka Pancasila Ambassador which serve as guidelines for implementation at the central and regional levels. However, as mandated in the Regulation of the Pancasila Ideology Development Agency Number 3 of 2022 concerning the Implementing Regulations of Presidential Regulation Number 51 of 2022 concerning the Paskibraka Program, there is a Master Plan that has not yet been made by BPIP for the implementation of the Paskibraka Program.

Based on the research results, it can be concluded that the bureaucratic structure in the implementation of the Paskibraka Program policy by BPIP still faces challenges in terms of role clarity, institutional integration, and division of tasks between units. Although BPIP has a

special Directorate that handles the Paskibraka Program, this structure is still under the coordination of the deputy who also handles other programs, so that the institutional capacity to manage programs on a national scale is not optimal. At the regional level, the main implementer is under Kesbangpol which is structurally part of the Ministry of Home Affairs, not BPIP, so that the absence of a direct command relationship often causes coordination and implementation in the regions to depend on informal relations and local initiatives.

Although DPPI has a legal basis as a mandatory partner in this program, in practice, operational and budget support from the center and regions has not been fully distributed. This makes implementation in some regions dependent on informal relations or varying internal policies. In addition, the absence of a special field or unit that handles the Paskibraka Program in Kesbangpol causes the burden of implementation to fall on a section with minimal personnel and must manage an annual program with a complex administrative burden. Kesbangpol informants even suggested that BPIP form a Technical Implementation Unit (UPT) in the regions or encourage the formation of a special field in Kesbangpol so that program implementation can run more structured and sustainable.

In Edward III's perspective, an unclear or unsupportive bureaucratic structure will hamper policy implementation because it causes role uncertainty, weak coordination, and low accountability of implementers. Therefore, restructuring the institutional structure both at the center and in the regions is an urgent strategic step. Strengthening the structure can be done by increasing the status of the Directorate to Deputy in BPIP, establishing a special field in Kesbangpol, and legalizing the role of DPPI as an official government partner. With a more assertive, hierarchical, and integrated structure, it is hoped that the implementation of the Paskibraka Program can take place more systematically, accountably, and consistently throughout Indonesia.

### **Supporting and Inhibiting Factors in the Implementation of the Paskibraka Program Policy**

Every policy implementation is inseparable from factors that can strengthen or weaken its implementation in the field. In the perspective of George C. Edward III's policy implementation theory, the success of a policy is not only determined by the content of the policy itself, but also by factors that influence the implementation process, both internal such as institutional capacity and the attitude of the implementer, and external such as social dynamics, politics, and coordination between actors.

In the context of the Paskibraka Program (Paskibraka) which is now under BPIP, various dynamics have emerged in the implementation process, both at the central and regional levels. This study found that there are a number of factors that drive the success of the program's implementation, but on the other hand there are also significant obstacles, especially at the regional operational level.

This section will systematically describe the findings based on the results of interviews with key informants, which are grouped into two main categories: supporting factors and inhibiting factors. This description is expected to provide a comprehensive picture of the real conditions of policy implementation and become the basis for formulating strategic recommendations in the next chapter.

## 1. Supporting Factors

Supporting factors are elements that provide a positive contribution to the success of a policy implementation. In the context of the implementation of the Paskibraka Program by BPIP, supporting factors are not only related to technical and institutional availability, but also to the values, spirit, and adaptive intelligence inherent in the implementer. To identify things that are strengths in the implementation process, the ASOCA theory is used which includes five strategic elements: Ability, Strength, Opportunity, Culture, and Agility.

### 1) *Abilities*(HR and Organizational Capabilities)

Human resource capability is one of the main assets in implementing policies. From the interview results, it is known that the implementers at the center, both from BPIP and DPPI, have a fairly good understanding of regulations, program structures, and technical implementation. They also have long experience in similar activities since this program was under the auspices of Dispora.

At the regional level, despite the limited number of staff, the implementers from Kesbangpol showed the ability to understand and carry out instructions from BPIP. This shows that in general, the ability of implementers at various levels is sufficient to support the implementation of the program. An understanding of the substance of the Pancasila ideology, processing of administrative activities, and coordination between units has been obtained, although it still requires further strengthening.

This capability is also strengthened by the willingness of implementers to learn and adapt to new implementation formats. This enthusiasm is an indication of individual and organizational capacity that supports successful implementation.

### 2) *Strength*(Structural and Institutional Strength)

Another major supporting factor is the existence of a strong legal basis, namely through Presidential Regulation Number 51 of 2022 which transfers the implementation of the Paskibraka Program from the Ministry of Youth and Sports to BPIP. In addition, BPIP Regulation Number 3 of 2022 provides a technical basis for the implementation of the program, including an explanation of the role of local governments through Kesbangpol.

The existence of this legal basis provides legitimacy to all implementers to carry out their duties with certainty of direction and formal protection. The clarity of this institutional structure is strengthened by the establishment of the Directorate of Paskibraka Program Implementation at BPIP, which specifically handles this activity, although its capacity is still limited.

At the regional level, Kesbangpol has a network that is accustomed to handling national activities, while DPPI has strength in the form of a wide and loyal alumni network. This combination of formal and informal strengths is a strategic strength that supports the implementation of programs in various regions.

### 3) *Opportunity*(Collaborative Opportunities and Public Support)

The Paskibraka program has great potential to be developed sustainably. One of the most prominent opportunities is the high enthusiasm and participation of Paskibraka candidates, which shows that this program has an appeal and pride value in the eyes of the



community. This condition creates moral and social support from the community for the implementation of the program.

In addition, the region's experience in organizing similar activities in the past provides an opportunity for easier implementation because the work pattern, trainer network, and selection system have been formed. With some adjustments, this system can be reused to support the implementation of the program which is now under the coordination of BPIP.

Another opportunity that can be utilized is the support from the Ministry of Home Affairs through Kesbangpol, which provides access to the central government to interact directly with the regions. The communication and coordination forum between agencies, if optimally activated, will be a strategic space in resolving technical obstacles and strengthening cross-agency collaboration.

#### 4) *Culture*(Positive Work Culture and Collaboration)

Cultural factors are also an important force in the implementation of the Paskibraka Program. In various regions, an organizational culture has been formed that considers Paskibraka activities as a meaningful annual routine agenda. The values of discipline, nationalism, and prestige inherent in this activity have been widely accepted by implementers, participants, and the community.

The culture of mutual cooperation is also seen from the role of DPPI, which voluntarily assists in the implementation of the program even though it does not receive a formal budget. Kesbangpol's willingness to involve various parties inclusively shows that a collaborative culture has developed well in several regions. This value strengthens social acceptance of the program and facilitates the involvement of wider actors.

#### 5) *Agility*(Emotional Intelligence and Adaptation of the Executor)

Program implementers demonstrated high adaptability to the dynamics and pressures of policy implementation. Despite facing a number of challenges such as delays in technical instructions from the center or resistance from previous implementers, the implementers continued to carry out their duties with enthusiasm and loyalty. DPPI and Kesbangpol remained active despite being faced with heavy workloads and bureaucratic complexity.

This adaptive intelligence is demonstrated through their ability to maintain good social relations between agencies, build informal communication, and create collaborative solutions amidst limitations. This emotional resilience is an important asset in ensuring the sustainability of policy implementation, especially during the current institutional transition period.

Based on the ASOCA approach, it can be concluded that the implementation of the Paskibraka Program policy by BPIP has various significant supporting factors. Clarity of policy legality (strength), technical ability of implementers (ability), opportunities for collaboration and public support (opportunity), inclusive organizational culture (culture), and high adaptation of implementers (agility) are key elements that strengthen the implementation process in various regions. This strength is a strategic foundation that must continue to be maintained and developed to ensure the success of the program in the long term and make Paskibraka an integral part of the development of Pancasila ideology for the young generation of Indonesia.

## 2. Inhibiting Factors

In policy implementation, inhibiting factors are elements that have the potential to disrupt or slow down the achievement of goals. The implementation of Paskibraka by BPPI has generally shown progress, but is not free from various obstacles that are technical, structural, and socio-cultural. Analysis of these inhibiting factors uses the ASOCA theory, which classifies obstacles based on the dimensions of Ability, Strength, Opportunity, Culture, and Agility.

### 1) *Abilities*(Limited Human Resources Capabilities and Understanding)

The lack of tiered training from BPPI has caused regional implementers to have to translate the technical instructions given briefly and sometimes in a tight time frame. This has resulted in inconsistent interpretation and quality of implementation. Informants from Kesbangpol stated that they had to work extra hard in a very limited time without adequate technical assistance from the center. This inequality of ability is a serious obstacle in creating equal implementation standards across all regions.

### 2) *Strength*(Structural, Human Resources, and Budget Weaknesses)

In terms of organizational strength, there is still a striking disparity in resources between regions. Several Kesbangpol only have 2-3 staff who manage all Paskibraka activities, from selection, training, to ceremonies. The absence of a special field that handles this program is also an additional burden for units that are already busy with tasks.

In addition, the absence of BPPI representatives in the regions such as Technical Implementation Units (UPT) causes the relationship between the center and regions to be coordinative, not structural. This weakens the effectiveness of direct supervision and technical guidance.

In addition, although DPPI has a legal basis as a mandatory partner in this program, in practice, operational and budget support from the center and regions has not been fully distributed. This makes implementation in some regions dependent on informal relations or varying internal policies.

### 3) *Opportunity*(Uneven Regional Commitments)

Nationally, this program has great potential, but its realization is highly dependent on the commitment of local governments. The results of the study show that there is a disparity in how regions prioritize this program. Some regions provide full support, including in terms of budget and facilitation, while other regions consider Paskibraka as an additional burden or a mere formality.

When commitment is weak, implementers are not given enough fiscal, institutional, or authority space to run the program optimally. As a result, opportunities to expand the impact of the program as a vehicle for ideological cadreship are limited, and implementation is only symbolic.

### 4) *Culture*(Old Culture and Resistance to Change)

Another significant obstacle is the old culture that has not fully changed, especially related to previous implementers such as the Purna Paskibraka Indonesia (PPI) organization. In some areas, there is still a tug of war over authority between PPI and new implementers

such as DPPI and Kesbangpol. Several informants said that there was social pressure from parties who previously played the main role in implementing Paskibraka.

The culture of regional bureaucracy also tends to be administrative and ceremonial, so that when this program is directed at strengthening ideological values and character development, not all implementers are ready to change this orientation. The work culture that rejects this change is an obstacle in itself in updating the substance of the program.

5) *Agility* (Adaptation Burden and Human Resource Resilience)

Field implementers, especially in Kesbangpol, are faced with a heavy workload in a short time, due to the delay in the distribution of technical instructions from the center. They must adjust the budget, administrative procedures, and technical implementation in a short time. This drains the energy and concentration of implementers, and increases the risk of implementation errors.

This condition becomes a fairly heavy emotional and psychological burden, especially since most implementers do not have an adequate mentoring or peer support system. Without emotional intelligence and an internal support system, this burden can reduce the spirit, loyalty, and even effectiveness of the implementer's work in the future.

Analysis of the inhibiting factors for the implementation of the Paskibraka Program through the ASOCA approach shows that the obstacles are not only technical, but also structural, cultural, and psychological. Inequality of ability, the absence of BPIP structures in the regions, weak commitment of local governments, resistance to change, and the pressure of adaptation without adequate support are real challenges that need to be addressed immediately. Therefore, sustainable policy implementation is not enough to rely only on regulations and the spirit of implementers, but also requires strengthening of HR capacity, legalization of implementing partners, organizational culture reform, and an adaptive support system that is able to maintain the sustainability of implementation amidst existing dynamics and pressures.

### 3. Strategy to Overcome Barriers to Implementing the Paskibraka Program Policy

After identifying various obstacles that disrupt the effectiveness of the implementation of the Paskibraka Program by BPIP, it is important to formulate a concrete, applicable, and systemic solution strategy. This strategy is designed to address weaknesses in aspects of human resource capabilities, institutional imbalances, communication and adaptation barriers, and a culture of resistance that hinders national policy integration. This strategic approach refers to field findings and is supported by the ASOCA framework, with a focus on strengthening internal organizations and managing external dynamics.

1) Improving Implementation Ability

To address the gap in understanding and technical capacity at the implementing level, strategies that can be implemented include:

- a. Preparation of uniform, structured, and competency-based national training modules for all implementers, both at the central and regional levels;
- b. Implementation of online and offline training periodically, not only before program implementation, but also in the early stages of regional budget planning; and

- c. A technical certification system for program implementers as a form of recognition of implementer competence and to encourage professionalism.
- 2) Strengthening Partner Structure and Legitimacy (Strength)  
To address the weak regional implementing structure and the lack of formal recognition of partners such as DPPI, suggested strategies include:
  - a. Establishment of BPIP Technical Implementation Units (UPT) in the regions or integration of Paskibraka affairs as a special field in Kesbangpol;
  - b. Strengthening the role of DPPI as an official and mandatory partner in technical implementation, with involvement from the planning stage to program evaluation; and
  - c. Strengthening the Directorate structure at BPIP to have broader authority and sufficient budget capacity to support national implementation.
- 3) Harmonization of Commitment and Strengthening of Coordination (Opportunity)  
Various differences in regional commitments need to be addressed through a strategic and communicative approach, including:
  - a. Preparation of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) or cooperation agreement between BPIP and the provincial/district/city government, so that regional commitments are documented and administratively binding;
  - b. Strengthening national and regional coordination forums, which invite all Kesbangpol, DPPI, and other stakeholders to align perceptions and prepare joint action plans; and
  - c. Increasing budget advocacy through the Ministry of Home Affairs and Bappenas so that program fund allocations can be included in the Special Allocation Fund or deconcentration mechanism.
- 4) Managing Cultural and Social Change (Culture)  
Resistance from old implementers and a rigid bureaucratic work culture needs to be approached with social and educational strategies, including:
  - a. Socialization of the Paskibraka transformation narrative in an inclusive manner, emphasizing that changes in implementers are a form of strengthening values, not eliminating roles;
  - b. Symbolic or functional involvement of previous organizations to a certain extent, as a form of respect for historical continuity; and
  - c. Documenting good practices from regions that have successfully implemented the transition, to serve as a learning reference and encourage other regions to imitate effective patterns.
- 5) Development of Human Resources Resilience and Adaptation (Agility)  
In order for implementers to survive changing pressures and dynamics, adaptive resilience strategies include:
  - a. Preparation of an earlier and more realistic implementation schedule and distribution of technical instructions, at least 3 months before implementation;
  - b. Facilitate psychosocial support and character development of implementing human resources, especially in dealing with social pressure or horizontal conflict; and

- c. Improving two-way communication between BPIP and regional implementers, including through digital monitoring platforms to accelerate response and clarification of instructions.

## CONCLUSION

Based on the results of research and analysis of the implementation of the Flag Raising Troops Program policy by BPIP, it can be concluded that the implementation of this policy has shown a positive direction, but still faces a number of challenges that need to be addressed. In the framework of George C. Edward III's policy implementation theory, the success of policy implementation is largely determined by four main variables: communication, resources, disposition, and bureaucratic structure. These four variables have been analyzed in depth based on the results of interviews with central and regional implementers. In terms of communication, BPIP has built a fairly effective and formal communication channel through the preparation of Technical Instructions (Juknis), Circulars, and the implementation of technical guidance. However, the main problem lies in the aspect of the timeliness of information delivery. Technical information that is often received by regional implementers at very close to the implementation of activities causes implementers to work under time pressure and has the potential to reduce the quality of implementation. This shows that communication has not fully met the principles of clarity and timeliness as stated by Edward III. In terms of resources, it was found that implementers at both the central and regional levels still face limitations in terms of the number of personnel, facilities and infrastructure, and institutional support. In the regions, the limited number of staff and the absence of a special unit to handle Paskibraka cause the implementers to have to work beyond ideal capacity. Meanwhile, at the central level, although there is a special Directorate, the number of employees and workload are not yet balanced. Although DPPI has a legal basis as a mandatory partner in this program, in practice, operational and budget support from the center and regions is not yet fully evenly distributed. This makes implementation in several regions dependent on informal relations or varying internal policies. In terms of disposition, it was found that the implementers, both from BPIP, DPPI, and Kesbangpol, generally have a supportive attitude and high commitment to the implementation of the program. They show loyalty and a spirit of dedication even though they are faced with various limitations and social pressures. However, this spirit has not been fully protected by policies that provide certainty of roles, protection, or adequate incentives. A strong disposition without solid institutional support risks causing fatigue and reducing the enthusiasm of implementers in the future. In terms of bureaucratic structure, it was found that the implementation of the Paskibraka Program still faces coordination challenges between the center and regions. BPIP as the main implementer does not have a direct command line to Kesbangpol in the regions, which is under the auspices of the Ministry of Home Affairs. The absence of a chain of command causes the implementation of policies in the regions to be coordinative, not instructive, and highly dependent on voluntary support from the regions. In addition, the absence of a special field structure in Kesbangpol or Technical Implementation Units (UPT) in the regions makes the implementation of the program less sustainable and incidental. Thus, it can be concluded



that the implementation of the Paskibraka Program policy by BPIP has been running, but not yet fully optimal. Systematic improvement efforts are needed in the aspects of timely communication, strengthening institutional structures, providing adequate resources, and providing legitimacy and incentives for implementing partners. These improvements are not only important to support the effectiveness of program implementation, but also to maintain the sustainability of Pancasila ideology development for the younger generation in a consistent and structured manner.

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